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Abstract
This paper examines the effect of tax policy on housing prices in Vietnam for the pe-
riod from October 2004 to September 2016 using event study approach. The authors 
find that all five key changes made to the personal income tax, corporate income tax 
and non-farm land use tax have caused the housing prices to decline on average 6-11% 
during the event window, but only the impact of the personal income tax changes is 
statistically significant. The fact that changes in housing prices are mostly seen prior to 
the effective date of the tax policy change implies that tax policy change indeed has in-
fluenced the housing prices in Vietnam. Although this research has not examined the 
mechanism through which tax policy has influenced the housing prices, the findings 
offer some implications for the government in terms of using tax policy for controlling 
housing prices in Vietnam. The research is also of very few papers in this literature that 
use the event study approach.
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between taxation and housing prices has been docu-
mented in the literature with little evidence. Most research studies have 
sought for the connections between housing market, including level of 
investments and prices, and economic variables in general. Various fac-
tors have been identified as having influenced the housing market, such 
as the income level (Mikhed & Zemcik, 2009; Goodhart & Hofmann, 
2008; Madsen, 2012), taxation (Turnovsky & Okuyama, 1994), cred-
it supply (Adams & Füss, 2010; Leung, 2004; Goodhart & Hofmann, 
2008), interest rates (Apergis & Rezitis, 2003; Igan et al., 2011; Goodhart 
& Hofmann, 2008; Zan & Wang, 2012), inflation rates (Kearl, 1979; 
Follain, 1982; Madsen, 2012; Apergis & Rezitis, 2003; Bork & Muller, 
2016), employment (Lerbs, 2011; Giussani et al., 1992; Baffoe-Bonnie, 
1998), or the demographic characteristics (Mankiw & Weil, 1989). 
The direct effect of tax policy on housing prices, however, has been 
limitedly documented. The indirect effect could be interpreted 
through the role of investments and demand in housing markets (see, 
for example, ECB, 2009; Andrews, 2010; Poterba, 1992; Skinner, 1996; 
Gervais, 2002; Feldstein, 1982; Berkovec & Fullerton, 1992). Some very 
few papers have estimated the direct effect of tax policy on housing 
prices (see, for example, Goulder, 1989; Best & Kleven, 2017; Bai et al., 
2014; Du & Zhang, 2015; Capozza et al., 1998; Rosenthal, 1999). This 
literature, although limited, has shown that tax policy is important to 
determining housing prices. 
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In Vietnam, housing prices surged 2.6 times between October 2004 and September 2016. The hous-
ing prices rose rapidly between October 2004 and mid-2008, but have been increasing slowly since 
then (General Statistics Office, 2017). The main characteristic of the housing market in Vietnam is 
that it was dominated by speculative investments, in which many buyers were simply investors rather 
than end users. The major changes in terms of tax policies relating to the housing market have been 
introduced after the mid-2008 in an attempt to curb the housing prices and to stabilize the market. 
The government, therefore, wants to see if the tax policy, and which taxes, have indeed influenced the 
housing prices.
This paper examines the effect of tax policy on housing prices in Vietnam. The findings are expected to 
offer some policy recommendations for Vietnamese government to monitor the housing prices through 
their taxation. As far as the authors know, this paper is the first to gauge the role of tax policies on hous-
ing prices in Vietnam, and perhaps of very few papers in this literature that use event study approach. 
Five events representing five key tax policy changes relating to housing markets are examined. Among 
others, our findings suggest that all tax policy changes caused the housing prices to decline on average 
by 6-11% for the 13 month event window. However, in terms of statistical significance, the decline in 
housing prices is significantly related to the changes made to personal income tax.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. The next section provides some brief literature on the effect 
of taxation on housing prices and the tax policy in Vietnam. Then, the methodology section presents 
details of our event study framework and discuss the data sample. Section 3 reports the test results and 
discussions. The last section offer some concluding remarks and recommendations to policy makers.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1. The effect of tax policy  
on housing prices
The relationship between tax policy and hous-
ing prices is mostly interpreted indirectly 
through mechanisms such as investments and 
demand in housing markets. For example, tax 
deductions are seen as one of the main driv-
ers for higher investments in housing markets 
in European countries, which, in turn, poten-
tially result in lower housing prices (ECB, 2009; 
Andrews, 2010). Another study by Poterba 
(1992) examines the effect of tax reforms on 
housing market in the United States in 1986 and 
finds that tax reforms reduce incentive for rent-
al housing investment, contributing to the de-
cline in multifamily housing starts and, in the 
long run, will lead to higher rents. Other studies 
(see, for example, Skinner, 1996; Gervais, 2002; 
Feldstein, 1982, 2009; Berkovec & Fullerton, 
1992; Turnovsky & Okuyama, 1994) have shown 
different results for the effect of tax policies on 
level of investments in housing markets and im-
plied that in the long term, these effects would 
inf luence housing prices.
Of very few papers that examine directly the effect 
of tax policy on housing prices, Goulder (1989) 
studies the 1986 Tax Reforms in the United States 
using a general equilibrium model and concludes 
that in the short term, the reductions in corpo-
rate tax rates and the elimination of investment 
tax credits have positive effects on housing in-
vestment, suggesting that a favorable corporate 
income tax policy would decrease the housing 
prices in the short run. Other researchers such as 
Best and Kleven (2017) on UK market look at the 
cost of housing transactions and find that transac-
tion taxes play an important role in housing pric-
es, and that housing prices respond very quickly 
to changes in transaction taxes. In another study, 
Capozza et al. (1998) assess the impact of income 
and property taxes on housing prices and find 
that the proposed tax changes result in substantial 
house price declines. They emphasize that if local 
governments raise property tax rates to offset the 
impact of the decline in housing prices on their 
tax revenues, prices fall further.
The literature, although limited, also sees interest-
ing but contradicting findings even if the same tax 
policy and sample are considered. Bai et al. (2014) 
explore the influence of a trial property tax policy 
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on housing prices in two provinces in China and 
find different effects: the tax policy helps lower 
housing prices in one province, but raises prices in 
other province. Examining the same property tax 
policy in the same two provinces, Du and Zhang 
(2015), however, find inverse conclusions: they find 
that the tax policy reduces the annual growth rate 
of housing prices in the province where Bai et al. 
(2014) had found an increase in housing prices; and 
they do not find significant effect of the tax policy 
on housing prices in the other province that have 
been found significantly lower in Bai et al. (2014).
The above literature suggests that although differ-
ent types of taxes are examined and the findings 
suggest mixed conclusions, it is safe to conclude 
that tax policy changes are important to influ-
ence housing market and prices. In other words, 
the governments may utilize various tax policies if 
they want to influence and control housing market 
through its prices. As shown in the literature, the 
most common channels for this influence to hap-
pen are through the level of investment in hous-
ing market made by developers and the demand 
for houses from home buyers (Goulder, 1989; 
Andrews, 2010).
1.2. Tax policy and housing prices  
in Vietnam
Figure 1 depicts the housing prices in Vietnam 
from October 2004 until September 2016. Within 
the period, the house prices increased on average 
2.6 times. There was a significant increase in the 
housing prices during the period until mid-year 
2008. The housing prices since mid-year 2008 look 
to have been stable. This is also the period where 
the key changes in tax policies relating to hous-
ing market were introduced, inducing us to think 
about the role of tax policy changes on the prices. 
The major changes in tax policies in Vietnam re-
lating to housing markets have happened since the 
introduction of the new Laws on Personal Income 
Tax which was effective from January 2009. The 
key change as compared to the law that had been 
in effect from 1992 was the inclusion of a specif-
ic clause for incomes gained from real estate and 
house sales, which imposes tax charges based on 
market price basis, rather than on the framed price 
regulated by the government (National Assembly, 
2007). This change eventually implies a higher tax 
charge than before for an identical transaction.
The law was later modified in July 2013 by speci-
fying that the transfer of housing ownership in 
all forms must be subject to taxation (National 
Assembly, 2013a). This addition was important, 
because until that time, the sale contracts under 
the form of authorized contracts, which do not 
transfer the ownership, had been popular and 
sellers had avoided tax charges under the law in-
troduced in 2009. Another modification was in 
January 2015, which required the application of 
one-for-all tax rate of 2% on the market price 
rather than the choice of 2% on market price 
or 25% on the capital gains (National Assembly, 
2014). This modification made it easy to calculate 
the tax, but more importantly, it cleared off the 
possibility of tax avoidance resulting from the 
fact that sellers could easily manipulate to reduce 
the capital gains. In the end, the two modifica-
tions, to some extent, have tightened the income 
tax law on incomes from housing sales by mak-
ing tax avoidance more difficult to achieve.
The other two policies include the modification to 
the corporate income tax in effect from January 1, 
2014 (National Assembly, 2013b) and the law on 
non-farm land use tax effective from January 1, 
2012 (National Assembly, 2011). The modification 
to the corporate income tax considered the income 
from housing and real estate sales, which had been 
considered separately prior to that as a source of 
total corporate taxable income. This was a good 
news to companies, because if the housing market 
went down, they could benefit from tax reduction. 
The law on non-farm land use tax, however, is a 
negative factor to the housing market, as it implied 
higher tax charges and thus higher costs for houses 
which obviously are built on non-farm land.
The key tax policy changes above were all expect-
ed to stabilize and make the housing market more 
transparent. An assessment on the effectiveness of 
those policy changes may be important for policy 
makers. A research such as the impact of tax poli-
cy changes on housing prices in Vietnam, however, 
has not been available. One reason could be the 
lack of data. This research therefore is expected 
to be the first to contribute to this literature with 
Vietnamese context.
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2. METHODS
2.1. Event study method
To estimate the relationship between the housing 
prices and tax policies, we employ the event study 
approach. Our approach is different from most of 
related literature on housing prices and tax policy, 
which normally uses regression models to gauge 
the relationship between housing prices and other 
macro variables, including tax policy related vari-
ables. Specifically, we employ the standard event 
study approach (see MacKinlay, 1997), in which 
the effective dates of tax policy changes passed 
through by the National Assembly are used as the 
event dates. By following this approach, we con-
sider the changes in house prices just like changes 
in the price of a financial asset.
Following framework suggested by MacKinlay 
(1997), in our model, events are the policy changes 
and the house price changes, or returns, are in-
dexed in event time .τ  We define the event date as 
0τ =  and 
1
1Tτ = +  to 
2
Tτ =  represents the event 
window, while 
0
1Tτ = +  to 
1
Tτ =  is the estima-
tion window. The length of estimation window is 
denoted as 
1 1 0
L T T= −  and 
2 2 1
L T T= −  to be the 
event window. The time frame is as follows:
The estimation of abnormal return – the difference 
between the actual return and the normal return 
– is implemented using two popular methods, the 
constant mean return and the market model return. 
With constant mean return method, the normal re-
turn is estimated using the following equation:
;
h,t h h,t
R µ ε= +  with ( ) 0h,tE ε =  and ( ) 2 ,
hh,t
var  εε σ=  (1)
where 
h
µ  is the mean return on asset h, 
h,t
R  is 
the period t  return on asset hand h,tε  is the time 
period t  disturbance term with an expectation of 
zero and variance 2 .
hεσ
With market model return method, we use the fol-
lowing equation:
h,t h h m,t h ,t
R Rα β ε⋅= + +  with ( ) 0h,tE ε =  and ( ) 2 ,
hh,t
var εε σ=  (2)
where 
h,t
R  and 
m,t
R  are the period t  returns on 
asset h  and the market, ,
h
α  
h
β  and 2
hεσ  are the 
parameters of the market model. Using the ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) method, these parame-
ters for the estimation window of observations are 
calculated as follows:
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Figure 1. Housing prices in Vietnam
Source: General Statistics Office (2017).
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Figure 2. Event and estimation window
125
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 14, Issue 4, 2017
  

 h L
R R
T
T
h h h m
2
1 1
21
2
0
1  

  
 
 , , ,  (5)
where


h
T
T
h
L
R 
 

1
1 10
1
,
 (6)
and


m
T
T
m
L
R 
 

1
1 10
1
,
 (7)
Let AR
h,τ
 ,  
1 2
1, …,  T  Tτ = +  be the sample of 
2
L  
abnormal returns in the event window, the sample 
abnormal returns are estimated. Under the con-
stant mean return approach, the abnormal returns 
are:
AR R
h h h, , 
    (8)
And under the market return model, the abnor-
mal returns are:
AR R R
h h h h m, , ,  
        (9)
Statistically, under the null hypothesis, condition-
al on the event window market returns, the abnor-
mal returns will be jointly normally distributed 
with a zero conditional mean and conditional 
variance  
2
AR
i ,
   where
 


 

2 2
1
2
2
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m m
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As noted in Mac Kinlay (1997), in the above equa-
tion, the conditional variance has two components. 
One component is the disturbance variance 2
hεσ  
and a second component is additional variance 
due to the sampling error in 
h
α  and .
h
β  The sam-
pling error leads to serial correlation of the abnor-
mal returns despite the fact that the true distur-
bances are independent through time. As shown 
in equation (11), if the estimation window 
1
L  is 
large enough, we can assume that the variance of 
the abnormal return observations will be 2
hεσ  and 
the abnormal return observations will become in-
dependent through time.Under null hypothesis 
the distribution of the sample abnormal return of 
a given observation in the event window is:
AR N AR
h h, ,
, 
 ∼ 0
2
     (11)
It is also common in event study to examine the 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) because 
individual abnormal returns do not say much 
about the overall role of the event. We define the ( )1 2, h,CAR τ τ τ  as the sample cumulative return 
from 
1
τ  to 
2
,τ  where 
1 1 2 2
:T Tτ τ< ≤ ≤
( ) 2
1
1 2
, 
h, h,
CAR AR
τ
τ τ
τ τ
τ τ
=
=∑  (12)
As 
1
L  increases the variance of ( )1 2, h,CAR τ τ τ  is
( )( ) ( )2 21 2 2 1 1 hh CAR , εσ τ τ τ τ σ= − + ⋅  (13)
The distribution of the CAR under null hypothesis 
is 
( ) ( )( )( )21 2 1 2, 0,  , h, h CARCAR ~ N  τ τ τ σ τ τ  (14)
3. DATA
The data used for this research are collected 
and compiled from various sources, includ-
ing the General Statistic Office of Vietnam, 
the Government of Vietnam Data Portal, the 
Ministry of Finance Data Portal, and the State 
Bank of Vietnam. Data is collected for a period 
from October 2004 until September 2016. The 
data include monthly housing price index for 
the whole country, the urban and rural areas, 
which are used to calculate returns on a hous-
ing portfolio, and monthly stock market index 
return, which is used as proxy for general mar-
ket return.
We also collect the data on dates of key policy 
changes, including the change in personal income 
tax, change in corporate income tax and change 
in tax of non-farm land use. We select only chang-
es that are applicable to real estate and housing 
markets. There are 5 event dates in which three 
are attributed to changes in personal income tax 
and one to corporate income tax and one to non-
farm land use tax. All policy changes are expected 
to make the housing markets more regulated by 
reducing the possibility for tax avoidance from 
house sales and transfers.
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4. RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSIONS
Five tax policy changes are selected for the event 
study tests. The personal income tax law, in which 
for the first time incomes from real estate and 
housing sales were distinguished from other in-
comes and legalized, was introduced to be in af-
fect from January 1, 2009. Further modifications 
with respect to the income from housing sales 
and transfer were made to be effective on July 1, 
2013 and January 1, 2015. These modifications 
both specified conditions that eventually ensure 
the income tax avoidance relating to housing 
sales and ownership transfers is less possible. All 
of the three major personal income tax changes 
are considered to be negative to the real estate and 
housing markets. The other two policies include 
the modification to the corporate income tax in 
effect from January 1, 2014 and the law on non-
farm land use tax effective from January 1, 2012. 
The modification to the corporate income tax 
considered the income from real estate sales as a 
source of total corporate taxable income that had 
been considered separately before. This is consid-
ered to be good news to companies, but it basically 
encourages companies to report losses from sales 
of real estates. The law on non-farm land use tax 
is another negative factor to the housing market, 
as it tightened further the room for potential tax 
avoidance resulting from the confusion of types of 
sales and ownership contracts. 
Table 1. Effect of the introduction of personal income tax law on housing price
Constant Mean Return
National Urban Ruralτ AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat
–6 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.62 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.73 0.70 0.73 0.70
–5 1.11 1.15 1.72 1.25 0.79 0.78 1.27 0.88 1.43 1.37 2.17 1.47
–4 –1.70 –1.75 0.02 0.01 –1.65 –1.61 –0.38 –0.21 –1.74 –1.66 0.43 0.24
–3 –2.15 –2.21 –2.12 –1.09 –2.22 –2.17 –2.60 –1.27 –2.06 –1.97 –1.63 –0.78
–2 –5.93 –6.11 –8.05 –3.71 –6.03 –5.90 –8.62 –3.77 –5.83 –5.58 –7.45 –3.19
–1 –3.43 –3.53 –11.47 –4.83 –3.12 –3.05 –11.74 –4.69 –3.68 –3.52 –11.13 –4.35
0 –0.30 –0.30 –11.77 –4.59 –0.08 –0.07 –11.82 –4.37 –0.49 –0.47 –11.62 –4.20
1 0.52 0.54 –11.24 –4.10 1.04 1.02 –10.77 –3.73 0.07 0.07 –11.55 –3.91
2 –0.77 –0.79 –12.01 –4.13 –0.64 –0.62 –11.41 –3.72 –0.88 –0.84 –12.42 –3.96
3 –0.62 –0.63 –12.62 –4.12 –0.50 –0.49 –11.91 –3.68 –0.70 –0.67 –13.12 –3.97
4 –0.10 –0.10 –12.72 –3.96 0.02 0.02 –11.88 –3.51 –0.21 –0.20 –13.33 –3.85
5 0.38 0.40 –12.33 –3.67 0.63 0.62 –11.25 –3.18 0.18 0.18 –13.14 –3.63
6 0.82 0.85 –11.51 –3.29 0.92 0.90 –10.32 –2.80 0.73 0.70 –12.41 –3.30
Market Model Return
National Urban Ruralτ AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat
–6 0.75 0.79 0.75 0.79 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.542 0.93 0.90 0.93% 0.90
–5 1.34 1.41 2.09 1.55 0.95 0.94 1.50 1.049 1.71 1.67 2.64 1.82
–4 –1.92 –2.02 0.17 0.10 –1.94 –1.92 –0.44 –0.253 –1.91 –1.87 0.73 0.41
–3 –2.49 –2.61 –2.32 –1.22 –2.63 –2.60 –3.07 –1.519 –2.35 –2.29 –1.62 –0.79
–2 –6.08 –6.38 –8.40 –3.94 –6.25 –6.18 –9.32 –4.121 –5.93 –5.78 –7.55 –3.29
–1 –3.45 –3.62 –11.85 –5.08 –3.21 –3.17 –12.53 –5.058 –3.65 –3.56 –11.20 –4.46
0 –0.37 –0.39 –12.22 –4.85 –0.22 –0.22 –12.75 –4.767 –0.51 –0.50 –11.71 –4.31
1 0.25 0.26 –11.97 –4.45 0.70 0.69 –12.05 –4.215 –0.15 –0.15 –11.86 –4.09
2 –0.61 –0.64 –12.58 –4.40 –0.55 –0.54 –12.60 –4.154 –0.67 –0.65 –12.53 –4.07
3 –0.45 –0.47 –13.03 –4.33 –0.40 –0.40 –13.00 –4.066 –0.48 –0.47 –13.01 –4.01
4 0.24 0.26 –12.78 –4.05 0.29 0.29 –12.70 –3.789 0.18 0.18 –12.82 –3.77
5 0.47 0.50 –12.31 –3.73 0.65 0.65 –12.05 –3.441 0.32 0.32 –12.50 –3.52
6 0.85 0.89 –11.46 –3.34 0.88 0.87 –11.17 –3.064 0.81 0.79 –11.69 –3.16
Note: Yousing price changes are considered as returns on a “housing” portfolio. Abnormal returns are calculated using two models 
of normal returns, the constant mean return and the market model return. Event month is the month in which the policy is 
effective. Event window spreads 13 month with 6 months before and 6 months after the event month. Estimation window includes 
42 months prior to the event window. Three portfolios are considered: national, the urban and rural areas. CAR is the cumulative 
abnormal return for month –6 to the specific month. Results using constant mean model of normal returns are reported in the top 
table; and the market model of normal returns are presented in the bottom table. The event month is January 2009.
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For each of the above policy changes above, the 
estimation window is 42 months prior to the 
event window, which covers a 13 month period 
with 6 months before and 6 months after the event 
month. We use both constant mean return and 
market model return to estimate the abnormal re-
turns in the even window. Tables 1-5 represent the 
statistics and test results.
With respect to the changes in corporate in-
come tax and non-farm land use tax, we do not 
find significant effect on the housing prices in 
all three samples, as seen by both the abnormal 
returns and the cumulative abnormal returns 
(Tables 4 and 5), although the cumulative ab-
normal returns decline sharply after the events. 
For the personal income tax, the introduction 
(Table 1) and the modifications (Tables 2 and 
3) of it show significant overall interference on 
housing prices in all three samples, as seen by 
the cumulative abnormal returns, which de-
cline around 8 to 12 percent during the window 
period. This interference is found significant 
starting 2 months prior to the event, and less 
after that. The introduction of personal income 
tax also causes significant decline in the hous-
ing prices in each of the four months prior to 
the event (Table 1). 
Table 2. Effect of the modification to personal income tax law on housing price
Constant Mean Return
National Urban Rural
τ AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat
–6 –0.74 –0.60 –0.74 –0.60 –0.82 –0.62 –0.82 –0.62 –0.68 –0.57 –0.68 –0.57
–5 –0.65 –0.53 –1.39 –0.80 –0.76 –0.58 –1.58 –0.85 –0.59 –0.49 –1.27 –0.75
–4 –1.01 –0.82 –2.40 –1.13 –1.06 –0.80 –2.64 –1.16 –0.97 –0.81 –2.24 –1.08
–3 –1.54 –1.26 –3.94 –1.61 –1.74 –1.32 –4.38 –1.66 –1.43 –1.20 –3.67 –1.54
–2 –1.63 –1.33 –5.58 –2.03 –1.83 –1.39 –6.21 –2.10 –1.47 –1.23 –5.13 –1.93
–1 –1.08 –0.88 –6.66 –2.21 –1.17 –0.89 –7.38 –2.28 –1.02 –0.86 –6.15 –2.11
0 –0.67 –0.55 –7.33 –2.26 –0.76 –0.58 –8.14 –2.33 –0.61 –0.51 –6.76 –2.15
1 –0.22 –0.18 –7.55 –2.17 –0.30 –0.23 –8.44 –2.26 –0.10 –0.08 –6.86 –2.04
2 –0.19 –0.16 –7.74 –2.10 –0.16 –0.12 –8.60 –2.17 –0.19 –0.16 –7.05 –1.97
3 –0.60 –0.49 –8.34 –2.15 –0.74 –0.56 –9.34 –2.24 –0.49 –0.41 –7.54 –2.00
4 –0.69 –0.56 –9.03 –2.22 –0.77 –0.58 –10.11 –2.31 –0.61 –0.51 –8.15 –2.06
5 1.21 0.98 –7.82 –1.84 1.48 1.12 –8.63 –1.89 1.13 0.95 –7.02 –1.70
6 –0.08 –0.07 –7.91 –1.79 0.02 0.01 –8.61 –1.81 –0.11 –0.09 –7.12 –1.66
Market Model Return
National Urban Rural
τ AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat
–6 –1.38 –1.15 –1.38 –1.15 –1.41 –1.10 –1.41 –1.10 –1.36 –1.16 –1.36 –1.16
–5 –0.61 –0.51 –1.98 –1.17 –0.67 –0.52 –2.07 –1.15 –0.59 –0.50 –1.94 –1.17
–4 –1.15 –0.96 –3.13 –1.51 –1.15 –0.90 –3.22 –1.46 –1.15 –0.98 –3.09 –1.53
–3 –1.41 –1.17 –4.54 –1.89 –1.56 –1.22 –4.78 –1.87 –1.34 –1.14 –4.43 –1.89
–2 –2.00 –1.67 –6.54 –2.44 –2.15 –1.68 –6.93 –2.42 –1.88 –1.61 –6.31 –2.41
–1 –0.79 –0.66 –7.33 –2.50 –0.83 –0.65 –7.76 –2.48 –0.77 –0.66 –7.08 –2.47
0 –0.76 –0.63 –8.09 –2.55 –0.80 –0.63 –8.56 –2.53 –0.74 –0.63 –7.82 –2.53
1 –0.06 –0.05 –8.16 –2.41 –0.09 –0.07 –8.66 –2.39 0.02 0.01 –7.81 –2.36
2 –0.36 –0.30 –8.51 –2.37 –0.28 –0.22 –8.93 –2.33 –0.40 –0.34 –8.20 –2.34
3 –0.64 –0.53 –9.15 –2.42 –0.73 –0.57 –9.66 –2.39 –0.57 –0.49 –8.77 –2.37
4 –0.77 –0.65 –9.93 –2.50 –0.80 –0.63 –10.47 –2.47 –0.73 –0.63 –9.51 –2.45
5 1.23 1.03 –8.69 –2.09 1.55 1.22 –8.91 –2.01 1.11 0.95 –8.39 –2.07
6 –0.49 –0.41 –9.18 –2.13 –0.34 –0.27 –9.25 –2.01 –0.56 –0.48 –8.95 –2.12
Note: The event month is July 2013.
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Table 3. Effect of the modification to personal income tax law on housing price
Constant Mean Return
National Urban Rural
τ AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat
–6 –0.30 –0.24 –0.30 –0.24 –0.32 –0.23 –0.32 –0.23 –0.26 –0.21 –0.26 –0.21
–5 –1.04 –0.82 –1.34 –0.75 –1.10 –0.79 –1.42 –0.73 –0.99 –0.81 –1.25 –0.72
–4 –1.11 –0.88 –2.45 –1.12 –1.17 –0.85 –2.59 –1.08 –1.07 –0.87 –2.33 –1.09
–3 –0.81 –0.64 –3.26 –1.29 –0.82 –0.59 –3.41 –1.23 –0.79 –0.64 –3.12 –1.27
–2 –1.47 –1.16 –4.72 –1.67 –1.60 –1.16 –5.01 –1.62 –1.41 –1.15 –4.53 –1.65
–1 –1.72 –1.36 –6.44 –2.08 –1.90 –1.37 –6.91 –2.04 –1.63 –1.33 –6.16 –2.05
0 –1.82 –1.44 –8.26 –2.47 –2.00 –1.44 –8.92 –2.43 –1.67 –1.36 –7.84 –2.41
1 –1.14 –0.90 –9.40 –2.63 –1.17 –0.85 –10.09 –2.57 –1.14 –0.93 –8.98 –2.58
2 –0.57 –0.45 –9.97 –2.63 –0.48 –0.35 –10.57 –2.54 –0.61 –0.50 –9.59 –2.60
3 0.11 0.09 –9.86 –2.46 0.11 0.08 –10.46 –2.39 0.13 0.10 –9.46 –2.43
4 0.54 0.43 –9.32 –2.22 0.83 0.60 –9.63 –2.10 0.65 0.53 –8.82 –2.16
5 –0.43 –0.34 –9.75 –2.22 –0.47 –0.34 –10.10 –2.10 –0.40 –0.33 –9.22 –2.16
6 –0.51 –0.40 –10.25 –2.25 –0.54 –0.39 –10.64 –2.13 –0.50 –0.41 –9.72 –2.19
Market Model Return
National Urban Rural
τ AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat
–6 –0.33 –0.26 –0.33 –0.26 –0.38 –0.27 –0.38 –0.27 –0.27 –0.22 –0.27 –0.22
–5 –1.10 –0.87 –1.43 –0.80 –1.19 –0.87 –1.57 –0.80 –1.03 –0.85 –1.30 –0.76
–4 –1.04 –0.82 –2.47 –1.13 –1.13 –0.82 –2.70 –1.13 –0.98 –0.81 –2.28 –1.08
–3 –0.81 –0.64 –3.28 –1.30 –0.85 –0.61 –3.55 –1.29 –0.77 –0.63 –3.05 –1.25
–2 –1.40 –1.11 –4.68 –1.66 –1.56 –1.13 –5.11 –1.66 –1.32 –1.09 –4.37 –1.61
–1 –1.67 –1.32 –6.35 –2.05 –1.88 –1.37 –6.99 –2.07 –1.56 –1.29 –5.93 –1.99
0 –1.87 –1.48 –8.22 –2.46 –2.08 –1.51 –9.07 –2.49 –1.70 –1.40 –7.63 –2.38
1 –1.16 –0.92 –9.38 –2.63 –1.22 –0.89 –10.29 –2.64 –1.14 –0.94 –8.77 –2.56
2 –0.49 –0.39 –9.87 –2.60 –0.43 –0.31 –10.72 –2.59 –0.51 –0.42 –9.28 –2.55
3 0.10 0.08 –9.78 –2.45 0.07 0.05 –10.66 –2.44 0.14 0.11 –9.15 –2.38
4 0.53 0.42 –9.24 –2.21 0.79 0.58 –9.86 –2.16 0.66 0.55 –8.48 –2.11
5 –0.47 –0.37 –9.71 –2.22 –0.54 –0.39 –10.40 –2.18 –0.42 –0.34 –8.90 –2.12
6 –0.55 –0.44 –10.26 –2.25 –0.61 –0.44 –11.01 –2.21 –0.52 –0.43 –9.42 –2.15
Note: The event month is January 2015.
Table 4. Effect of the modification to corporate income tax law on housing price
Constant Mean Return
National Urban Rural
τ AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat
–6 –0.52 –0.40 –0.52 –0.40 –0.58 –0.42 –0.58 –0.42 –0.48 –0.38 –0.48 –0.38
–5 –0.07 –0.05 –0.59 –0.32 –0.12 –0.09 –0.70 –0.36 0.03 0.03 –0.44 –0.25
–4 –0.04 –0.03 –0.62 –0.28 0.02 0.02 –0.68 –0.28 –0.06 –0.05 –0.50 –0.23
–3 –0.45 –0.35 –1.07 –0.42 –0.56 –0.40 –1.24 –0.44 –0.36 –0.29 –0.86 –0.34
–2 –0.54 –0.42 –1.61 –0.56 –0.59 –0.42 –1.83 –0.59 –0.48 –0.38 –1.33 –0.48
–1 1.36 1.06 –0.25 –0.08 1.66 1.20 –0.16 –0.05 1.26 1.02 –0.07 –0.02
0 0.07 0.06 –0.18 –0.05 0.20 0.14 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 –0.05 –0.01
1 –1.59 –1.23 –1.76 –0.48 –1.87 –1.35 –1.83 –0.47 –1.41 –1.13 –1.45 –0.41
2 –1.69 –1.31 –3.45 –0.89 –1.92 –1.38 –3.75 –0.90 –1.56 –1.25 –3.01 –0.81
3 –1.51 –1.17 –4.96 –1.22 –1.89 –1.36 –5.64 –1.28 –1.26 –1.01 –4.26 –1.09
4 –0.52 –0.40 –5.48 –1.28 –0.57 –0.41 –6.21 –1.35 –0.48 –0.38 –4.74 –1.15
5 –0.34 –0.26 –5.81 –1.30 –0.33 –0.24 –6.54 –1.36 –0.33 –0.26 –5.07 –1.18
6 –0.52 –0.40 –6.33 –1.36 –0.59 –0.42 –7.13 –1.42 –0.44 –0.35 –5.50 –1.23
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Table 5. Effect of the introduction of the non-farm land use tax law on housing price
Constant Mean Return
National Urban Ruralτ AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat
–6 –0.81 –0.50 –0.81 –0.50 –0.88 –0.55 –0.88 –0.55 –0.78 –0.47 –0.78 –0.47
–5 –0.28 –0.17 –1.09 –0.48 –0.17 –0.11 –1.04 –0.47 –0.34 –0.21 –1.13 –0.48
–4 –0.80 –0.50 –1.89 –0.68 –0.88 –0.55 –1.92 –0.70 –0.74 –0.44 –1.87 –0.65
–3 –1.20 –0.74 –3.09 –0.96 –1.51 –0.95 –3.43 –1.08 –0.97 –0.58 –2.85 –0.85
–2 –1.05 –0.65 –4.14 –1.15 –1.22 –0.77 –4.64 –1.31 –0.92 –0.55 –3.77 –1.01
–1 –0.66 –0.41 –4.80 –1.22 –0.62 –0.39 –5.26 –1.36 –0.69 –0.41 –4.47 –1.09
0 0.54 0.34 –4.26 –1.00 0.60 0.38 –4.66 –1.11 0.56 0.33 –3.91 –0.88
1 1.30 0.81 –2.96 –0.65 1.73 1.10 –2.92 –0.65 1.08 0.64 –2.83 –0.60
2 1.14 0.71 –1.82 –0.38 1.40 0.89 –1.52 –0.32 1.04 0.62 –1.80 –0.36
3 –1.61 –1.00 –3.43 –0.67 –1.73 –1.09 –3.25 –0.65 –1.59 –0.95 –3.39 –0.64
4 –2.14 –1.33 –5.57 –1.04 –2.48 –1.56 –5.72 –1.09 –1.96 –1.17 –5.36 –0.97
5 –2.38 –1.48 –7.95 –1.42 –2.71 –1.71 –8.43 –1.54 –2.20 –1.32 –7.56 –1.30
6 –2.10 –1.30 –10.05 –1.73 –2.46 –1.55 –10.89 –1.91 –1.87 –1.12 –9.44 –1.56
Market Model Return
National Urban Ruralτ AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat
–6 –0.74 –0.46 –0.74 –0.46 –0.79 –0.50 –0.79 –0.50 –0.73 –0.44 –0.73 –0.44
–5 –0.36 –0.23 –1.10 –0.49 –0.23 –0.15 –1.02 –0.46 –0.44 –0.27 –1.17 –0.50
–4 –0.83 –0.52 –1.93 –0.69 –0.89 –0.56 –1.91 –0.70 –0.79 –0.47 –1.96 –0.68
–3 –1.19 –0.74 –3.12 –0.97 –1.48 –0.95 –3.39 –1.08 –0.98 –0.59 –2.94 –0.88
–2 –0.93 –0.58 –4.05 –1.13 –1.08 –0.69 –4.47 –1.27 –0.82 –0.49 –3.76 –1.01
–1 –0.56 –0.35 –4.61 –1.17 –0.50 –0.32 –4.97 –1.29 –0.61 –0.37 –4.37 –1.07
0 0.37 0.23 –4.24 –1.00 0.45 0.29 –4.52 –1.09 0.37 0.22 –4.00 –0.91
1 1.15 0.72 –3.09 –0.68 1.60 1.02 –2.92 –0.66 0.91 0.55 –3.09 –0.65
2 1.06 0.66 –2.02 –0.42 1.34 0.86 –1.57 –0.33 0.94 0.57 –2.14 –0.43
3 –1.73 –1.08 –3.76 –0.74 –1.83 –1.17 –3.41 –0.69 –1.73 –1.04 –3.88 –0.74
4 –2.02 –1.26 –5.78 –1.09 –2.34 –1.49 –5.75 –1.10 –1.86 –1.11 –5.74 –1.04
5 –2.37 –1.48 –8.15 –1.47 –2.68 –1.71 –8.43 –1.55 –2.21 –1.33 –7.95 –1.38
6 –2.09 –1.30 –10.24 –1.77 –2.43 –1.55 –10.86 –1.92 –1.88 –1.13 –9.83 –1.63
Note: The event month is January 2012.
Table 4 (cont). Effect of the modification to corporate income tax law on housing price
Market Model Return
National Urban Ruralτ AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat AR, % t-stat CAR, % t-stat
–6 –0.59 –0.46 –0.59 –0.46 –0.63 –0.46 –0.63 –0.46 –0.57 –0.46 –0.57 –0.46
–5 0.06 0.05 –0.52 –0.29 0.03 0.02 –0.59 –0.31 0.14 0.11 –0.42 –0.24
–4 –0.17 –0.13 –0.69 –0.31 –0.09 –0.06 –0.68 –0.29 –0.21 –0.17 –0.63 –0.30
–3 –0.47 –0.37 –1.17 –0.46 –0.56 –0.41 –1.25 –0.46 –0.40 –0.33 –1.04 –0.42
–2 –0.60 –0.47 –1.77 –0.62 –0.63 –0.46 –1.88 –0.62 –0.56 –0.46 –1.60 –0.58
–1 1.39 1.09 –0.38 –0.12 1.71 1.25 –0.17 –0.05 1.27 1.03 –0.33 –0.11
0 –0.25 –0.20 –0.63 –0.19 –0.10 –0.08 –0.27 –0.08 –0.32 –0.26 –0.65 –0.20
1 –1.76 –1.38 –2.39 –0.67 –2.02 –1.48 –2.29 –0.59 –1.60 –1.30 –2.25 –0.65
2 –1.71 –1.35 –4.10 –1.08 –1.92 –1.41 –4.21 –1.03 –1.60 –1.30 –3.85 –1.05
3 –1.43 –1.13 –5.53 –1.38 –1.79 –1.31 –6.00 –1.39 –1.20 –0.98 –5.05 –1.30
4 –0.43 –0.33 –5.96 –1.41 –0.46 –0.33 –6.46 –1.43 –0.41 –0.33 –5.46 –1.34
5 –0.43 –0.33 –6.38 –1.45 –0.40 –0.29 –6.85 –1.45 –0.44 –0.35 –5.89 –1.38
6 –0.61 –0.48 –7.00 –1.53 –0.66 –0.49 –7.52 –1.53 –0.55 –0.45 –6.45 –1.46
Note: The event month is January 2014.
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The findings suggest that personal income tax 
policy plays a key role in the housing prices in 
Vietnam during the study period. Although our 
results have not shown the mechanism through 
which personal income tax policy has influenced 
the housing prices as in typical event study ap-
proach, it is still meaningful to draw implications 
for policy makers. In terms of state management 
of the housing market, if the government wants 
to manage the housing market through taxation, 
personal income tax policy could be most effec-
tive. The fact that price changes mostly happened 
prior to, and not much after, the effective date 
of the tax policy change indicates that tax policy 
changes indeed have influenced the housing pric-
es. Broadly speaking, policies that correlate to per-
sonal income in general should be effective to con-
trolling housing prices. This is similar to findings 
from the literature such as Adams and Fuss (2010), 
Goodhart and Hofmann (2008), or Madsen (2012).
CONCLUSION
The effect of tax policy on housing prices has been documented in the literature with little evidence 
on the direct relationship. Most research studies have examined the effect of tax policy on level of 
investments supplied by developers and on the level of income that inf luences the demand for hous-
ing by buyers to implicitly conclude on the effect on housing prices (ECB, 2009; Andrews, 2010; 
Poterba, 1992; Skinner, 1996; Gervais, 2002; Feldstein, 1982; Berkovec & Fullerton, 1992). There 
are only few research studies that have provided evidences for the direct relationship between tax 
policy and housing prices (Goulder, 1989; Best & Kleven, 2017; Bai et al., 2014; Du & Zhang, 2015; 
Capozza et al., 1998; Rosenthal, 1999). Various forms of tax policies and reforms have been studied 
and although results are varying, they have all agreed on that tax policy plays an important role in 
determining housing prices.  
In Vietnam, to the best of our knowledge, there has not been any research in this area found in the 
literature. During the past period from 2004 to 2016, the average housing prices in Vietnam increased 
2.6 times, during which housing prices surged dramatically between 2004 and 2008 and stabilized or 
gradually increased after that. One reason for this change in housing price pattern might be because 
of the major changes in tax policies in Vietnam from 2008 and afterwards that were designed to curb 
and stabilize the housing market. It is, therefore, important for policy makers to understand if indeed it 
was the tax policy changes and reforms that played the role on housing market. The conclusion on this 
would be important for the government to utilize their tax policies as a tool to manage housing prices 
in the future.
This paper has examined the effect of tax policy on housing prices in Vietnam and offered policy rec-
ommendations for the Vietnamese government to help them monitor the housing prices through their 
taxation. Our research is the first paper that looks at the impact of tax policy changes on housing prices 
in Vietnam, and perhaps of the few papers in the literature that use event study approach to gauge this 
impact (a relevant example is Kuttner & Shim, 2016). We have selected five events representing five key 
tax policy changes made to personal income tax, corporate income tax, and non-farm land use tax in 
this study.
Our research findings suggest that all five key changes made to personal income tax, corporate income 
tax and non-farm land use tax have caused the housing prices to decline on average 6-11% during the 13 
month window period but only the personal income tax change in January 2009 sees statistically signifi-
cant impact. This implies that the personal income tax policy could be one of the key influential factors 
that determine housing prices. And hence, in order to monitor the housing market, in term of tax policy, 
the government could use personal income tax as a monitoring tool. We understand that an in-depth 
analysis of the mechanisms through which personal income tax has influenced housing prices should 
make this policy recommendation more complete, but we leave this for further research.
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